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Introduction
On 17 April 2013, an explosion that 
occurred at the West Fertilizer Company 
(WFC) in West, Texas, resulted in the death 
of 15 persons and hundreds of injuries. 
The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board (CSB), an independent 
U.S. federal agency charged with investi-
gating industrial chemical accidents and 
issuing recommendations aimed at preventing 
and mitigating their recurrence, conducted a 
detailed review of the devastating explosion. 
The CSB’s final investigation report, released 
in January 2016, illustrates the severe public 
health impacts of chemical incidents when 
they occur at fixed facilities that neighbor 
residential communities (CSB 2016).
The explosion occurred at 1951 hours, 
only 20 minutes after the WFC fire was 
observed and reported to the fire department. 
The explosion of fertilizer-grade ammonium 
nitrate (FGAN)—with an explosive energy 
equivalent to cause the damage of 12.5 tons 
of TNT (2,4,6-trinitrotoluene)—fatally 
injured 12 emergency responders and three 
members of the community, and caused 
> 260 people to seek treatment for injuries. 
More than 150 offsite buildings were rendered 
uninhabitable following the incident. Among 
these structures were those of the nearby West 
Intermediate School and the West High 
School, located approximately 550 and 1,150 
feet away, respectively, as shown in Figure 1. 
The siting of schools near facilities that store 
or produce hazardous chemicals is not unique 
to West, Texas. In the state of Texas alone, the 
CSB found that 19 (47.5%) of the 40 facili-
ties storing FGAN are located within 0.5 miles 
of an elementary school, secondary school, or 
high school. One school identified was only 
0.12 mile from a FGAN facility, which is closer 
than the schools damaged in West. The CSB 
has identified a lack of safe land use planning 
as a contributing factor to the severity of the 
consequences in 13 of its prior investigations.
Fortunately, the incident occurred in 
the evening, when school was not in session. 
All other conditions unchanged, had the fire 
and subsequent explosion occurred during 
the school day or when an evening activity 
or sporting event was taking place, it is likely 
that the injuries and fatalities would have 
been significantly greater, especially given the 
short time (20 minutes) that elapsed between 
the fire and the explosion. The total that 
could have been exposed at all four schools, 
assuming full attendance, was 1,486 students 
and 191 staff members, with 665 students and 
86 staff combined at the Intermediate School 
and the High School, both of which sustained 
the most damage.
Blast overpressure from the explosion, as 
well as fires that began postexplosion, caused 
damage to the West Elementary School, High 
School, Middle School, and Intermediate 
School. Damage surveys showed that debris 
accumulated in the hallways and ceilings 
in several classrooms and the gymnasium 
collapsed at the West Intermediate School, 
as shown in Figure 2. Following the blast 
wave, a fire also started at West Intermediate 
School, which would have exposed students 
and staff to heat and smoke. The ceiling, light 
fixtures, and other debris were thrown onto 
the desks of one classroom. Glazing hazards—
or evidence of flying glass fragments—were 
found in the schools a significant distance 
from broken windows. The CSB commis-
sioned blast modeling experts to examine 
structural damage and estimate overpressures 
at varying locations in all directions from the 
center of the explosion. External pressures 
measured between 0.4 and 1 lb/in2 (psi) 
[2.76 kPa (kilopascals)] for the West High 
School and 0.8 to 2.0 psi (5.52–13.79 kPa) 
for the Intermediate School. Injuries such as 
lacerations from glass and flying debris are 
commonly associated with these overpressures. 
The level of structural damage within the 
schools ranged from light, repairable damage 
and window glazing to large deformation 
of structural components. The more severe 
damage is usually associated with serious 
injuries to occupants, and the CSB esti-
mated that 10-40% of occupants would have 
suffered fatal injuries (ABS Consulting 2015). 
Any students and staff present would have 
been covered in debris and would have had 
to climb over the debris to reach the exit. Due 
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to the extent of the damage, the Intermediate 
and High Schools were demolished, with 
much of the Middle School demolished as 
well. The full details and consequences of 
the incident can be found in the CSB’s final 
 investigation report (CSB 2016). 
The tragedy at WFC caused many to 
wonder why a community was located so 
close to an FGAN storage facility. The WFC 
began operations in 1962; as the City of 
West developed over the years, it expanded 
toward the facility without any state or local 
zoning regulations to govern the separation 
between WFC and community structures. 
The schools closest to the WFC that sustained 
the most damage—the Intermediate and the 
High School—were built in 1985 and 2000, 
respectively, after the fertilizer storage facility 
began operation. Texas, like many states in the 
United States, has no state regulations relating 
to siting schools near hazardous facilities; as a 
result, the school system was not prohibited 
from siting its buildings near a facility that 
stored hazardous chemicals.
Discussion
Several studies have attempted to quantify the 
risk of exposure to students from chemical 
incidents, as well as the frequency with which 
chemical incidents injure children at school. 
A study using the Hazardous Substances 
Emergency Events Surveillance (HSEES) 
system, coordinated by the Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) 
found that between 1999 and 2008, 11% 
(1,730) of the 15,506 persons injured from 
chemical incidents were students exposed at 
school (Duncan et al. 2015); however, this 
analysis and other earlier analyses do not 
distinguish students injured by incidents such 
as school laboratory accidents, intentional acts, 
and offsite consequences from those injured 
by fixed industrial facilities (Wattigney et al. 
2008). Data from the combined HSEES 
annual reports between 2003 and 2009 noted 
that of the events for which the ATSDR 
was able to geocode, approximately 5,962 of 
the reported 53,036 events occurred within 
0.25 mile of a school (ATSDR 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2009, 2010).
Analysis using information submitted to 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA) Risk Management Program (RMP) 
characterizes the risk imposed to students 
from sources near educational institutions. 
The RMP requires facilities with more than a 
specified quantity of a specified substance to 
report information to the U.S. EPA and imple-
ment a risk management program. Part of this 
program includes a type of hazard analysis 
called a vulnerability zone, which identifies 
the geographic area and population that would 
be affected should a hazardous substance 
release occur (U.S. EPA 1987). Using RMP 
information collected by EPA, the Center 
for Effective Government has estimated that 
19.6 million (36.6%) of 53.6 million children 
attend schools located in the vulnerability 
zone of fixed facilities that report to the RMP 
(Frank and Moulton 2014).
Proximity to industrial facilities also 
includes potential exposures to hazardous 
chemicals accidental air releases. For example, 
the CSB’s investigation of the 2012 fire at the 
Chevron Refinery in Richmond, California, 
found that exposure to the particulates 
Figure 1. Map Showing Proximity of the WFC Facility to Schools and Other Public Structures (Source: 
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Figure 2. Interior of Burned Northeast Section of West Intermediate School (Source: ABS Consulting 2015).
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resulting from the plume caused approxi-
mately 15,000 people to seek medical atten-
tion (CSB 2015). Legot et al. (2010) looked 
at facilities with the highest releases of air 
toxics, gathered from the U.S. EPA Toxics 
Release Inventory data, for five chemicals 
that are known developmental toxins (lead, 
mercury, carbon disulfide, manganese, and 
toluene) and found that 1,977 schools were 
located within approximately a 2-mile radius 
of 305 facilities, putting approximately 
964,525 children at risk.
Currently no federal agency has the 
authority to prohibit school siting near 
hazardous facilities, or to consider potential 
environmental hazards of the site or adjacent 
site when siting schools. All states have 
compulsory education laws, and the over-
whelming majority of students attend school 
outside the home. States typically delegate 
authority for decision making to the local 
education agency and for land use planning 
to local municipalities (NASBE 2016). In 
2006, Rhode Island Legal Services (RILS) 
surveyed state laws, regulations, and policies 
to determine which states had codes or regula-
tions in place to manage the siting of schools 
near hazardous facilities and other pollution 
sources. RILS found that at the time of the 
survey, 20 states had no policies that addressed 
the siting of schools near environmental 
hazards, including the assessment of potential 
school sites and their proximity to environ-
mental hazards (RILS 2006). Further, only 
14 state policies prohibit the siting of schools 
near hazards or pollution sources; the more 
common policy is only to require the consider-
ation of siting factors. For example, California 
has established standards for selecting the 
location of new schools, including prohibiting 
the siting of schools near railroads, areas with 
heavy traffic, aboveground water or fuel storage 
tanks, aboveground or underground pipelines 
that pose a safety hazard, or hazardous waste 
disposal (California Department of Education 
2015). In addition, California schools receiving 
state funding must perform an environmental 
assessment that considers the threat of a nearby 
release of hazardous material (California 
Education Code 1996). Though most of these 
policies are in place under state education 
codes and departments of education, environ-
mental planners, educators, and public health 
professionals all have a role in influencing 
school siting policies and preventing school 
siting near hazardous facilities (Cohen 2010).
Though there is no federal agency with 
the authority to regulate school siting, the 
U.S. EPA was authorized by Congress to 
create voluntary school siting guidelines. 
The resulting School Siting Guidelines (U.S. 
EPA 2011) are the most robust that exist 
for considering environmental exposures in 
the siting of schools. Although these siting 
guidelines are indeed comprehensive, they are 
nonetheless voluntary. The guidelines are not 
intended to apply to existing schools, and only 
include the consideration of environmental 
and siting factors for new uses or new schools. 
Though the U.S. EPA’s guidelines focus 
on exposure to environmental hazards and 
health risks, such as exposure to air pollution, 
they also cover physical hazards, such as fire 
or explosion. As they relate to large industrial 
facilities, the guidelines state that the screening 
perimeter for identifying large industrial facili-
ties of interest is 0.5 mile. The World Health 
Organization (WHO), in their information 
series on school health, recommends a distance 
of 2 miles between schools and hazardous facil-
ities (WHO 2003), which is consistent with 
the CSB’s observations of significant commu-
nity damage in the City of West up to 2 miles 
away from the explosion epicenter. The poten-
tial safety hazards posed by these industrial 
facilities include explosions or fire. With regard 
to ameliorating these hazards, the guidelines 
recommend emergency shelter design incor-
porated into the new schools and the use of 
all-hazards emergency response plans. In terms 
of identifying and evaluating all large industrial 
facilities within a 0.5-mile radius, the guide-
lines state that the evaluation should include 
consulting air quality agencies. 
Based on the findings of the West inves-
tigation and the identification of similar 
situations in Texas and the United States by 
others, we suggest that additional guidance 
include considering the physical properties, 
such as explosive or flammability character-
istics, of the materials stored at these identi-
fied industrial facilities. The use of setback 
distances when considering the location of 
new schools would also help reduce exposure 
to physical hazards such as fire and explosion.
Actions to ensure awareness of chemical 
hazards near school buildings and communi-
ties before initiating new development can be 
taken by government agencies, community 
members, local emergency response officials 
and school officials. Schools should consult 
with local emergency response officials, such 
as local emergency planning committees or 
state emergency response officials, to better 
understand the characteristics of the chemicals 
present at industrial facilities in their locale and 
to be included in emergency response plans 
and practice activities. Operators and owners 
of facilities should likewise engage in commu-
nicating the hazards to neighboring communi-
ties, and the U.S. EPA has developed, in its 
RMP program guidance, guidelines for facili-
ties in providing data and information to the 
public (U.S. EPA 2004). Public information 
tools, such as geographic information systems, 
are available through the the U.S. EPA’s 
Risk-Screen Environmental Indicators (RSEI) 
program (https://www.epa.gov/rsei) and 
Toxics Release Inventory program (https://
www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-
program), which provide information and 
data on the location of facilities with hazardous 
chemicals required to report to the U.S. 
EPA under the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) 
(2011), as well as information on the risks 
associated with the chemicals in use at each 
facility. Armed with greater awareness and 
knowledge of hazards, local governments and 
land use planners can then make informed 
decisions and use a variety of regulatory tools 
to mitigate the potential offsite impacts of 
hazards at industrial facilities. This includes 
the use of protective zoning, which can restrict 
development in hazardous areas (Schwab 
2010). Regulatory tools that have been used 
to manage land use hazards near transmission 
pipelines, which may be translated for use near 
chemical facilities, include low-density zoning 
requirements near facilities; the use of fire resis-
tance in the building codes for public build-
ings; deed restrictions on development; and the 
use of setback distances near chemical facilities 
(Osland 2013).
Conclusion
The CSB’s investigation of the WFC explo-
sion highlights the devastation that can occur 
when schools and communities are located 
near facilities storing hazardous chemicals. In 
light of the current lack of federal authority 
for oversight of land use near educational insti-
tutions, states should take a proactive role in 
promulgating state regulations that prohibit 
the siting of schools near facilities that store 
hazardous chemicals. The CSB is in the process 
of undertaking researching issues concerning 
land use planning near industrial facilities. 
Such research will focus on documenting 
the extent of the problem and assessing the 
adequacy of existing regulations and policies 
related to land-use planning near chemical 
facilities. The safety of our communities is a 
shared responsibility and the CSB hopes that 
other federal agencies, and state and local 
authorities with FGAN in their jurisdictions, 
will learn from the lessons of the WFC inves-
tigation and partner with the CSB on outreach 
and advocacy activities to ensure that the places 
where our children learn are not vulnerable to 
the consequences of chemical accidents.
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